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ABSTRACT
In heterogeneous dense networks where spectrum is shared,
users privacy remains one of the major challenges. When
the receivers are not only interested in their own signals
but also in eavesdropping other users’ signals, the cross
talk becomes information leakage. We propose a novel
and efficient secrecy rate enhancing relay strategy EFFIN
for information leakage neutralization. The relay matrix is
chosen such that the effective leakage channel (spectral and
spatial) is zero. Thus, it ensures secrecy regardless of receive
processing employed at eavesdroppers and does not rely on
wiretaps codes to ensure secrecy, unlike other physical layer
security techniques such as artificial noise. EFFIN achieves a
higher sum secrecy rate over several state-of-the-art baseline
methods.
Index Terms— Interference relay channel; Interference
neutralization; Amplify-and-forward relay; worst-case secre-
cy rate; multi-antenna systems
I. INTRODUCTION
The trend of future wireless network systems is towards
spectrum sharing over different wireless infrastructures.
With isolated wireless infrastructures, such as multiple non-
cooperating LTE cells, ensuring data security remains a
major technical challenge. Physical layer security techniques
provide an alternative approach when the front-ends are of
limited computation capability and are not able to carry out
standard cryptography methods such as symmetric key and
asymmetric key encryption. Physical layer security techni-
ques [1]–[3] provide an additional protection to the con-
ventional secure transmission methods using cryptography.
Due to space limitation, we are not able to list all physical
layer security results, interested readers are referred to recent
tutorial papers [4], [5].
†This work has been performed in the framework of the European
research project DIWINE, which is partly funded by the European Union
under its FP7 ICT Objective 1.1 - The Network of the Future.∗This work is
supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) in the Collaborative
Research Center 912 “Highly Adaptive Energy-Efficient Computing”.
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Fig. 1. The wireless relay-assisted network with layer one
repeaters and one smart relay is shown in subfigure (a).
The dotted lines demonstrate the equivalent links between a
source and a destination taking into account the presence of
the repeaters. All paths from source to destination nodes take
two time slots (through either the smart relay or repeaters).
The equivalent channel is established in subfigure (b) by re-
placing the relay as an instantaneous relay. Information going
through the instantaneous relay arrives at the destinations at
the same time as over the direct links.
In relay-assisted multi-user systems, a potential malicious
user in the system can lead to compromised confidentiality.
Many novel strategies have been proposed to improve the
secrecy in relay systems, including cooperative jamming [6],
[7], noise-forwarding [8], signal-forwarding strategies [9],
[10] and multi-carrier relay systems with external eaves-
dropper(s) [11], [12]. Yet, a joint optimization of secrecy
rates over the frequency-spatial resources in a relay-assisted
multi-user interference channel (with internal eavesdroppers)
remains an open problem. This is the goal of our paper.
We assume that the relay employs an amplify-and-forward
(AF) strategy which provides flexibility in implementation
as the relay is transparent to the modulation and coding
schemes and induces negligible signal processing delays
[13]. The novel notion of relay-without-delays, also known
as instantaneous relays if the relays are memoryless [14]–
[16], refers to relays that forward signals consisting of both
current symbol and symbols in the past, instead of only
the past symbols as in conventional relays. As shown in
Figure 1, the instantaneous relay model provides a matching
model of layer-1 repeaters connected networks (such as LTE
networks) and helps us analyze the system performance of
nowadays repeaters connected networks1.
In order to provide secure transmission over relay-assisted
multi-carrier networks, we propose a relay strategy termed
as information leakage neutralization which algebraically
neutralizes information leakage from each transmitter in the
network to each eavesdropper on each frequency subcarrier.
This method is adopted from a technique on relay networks,
termed as interference neutralization (IN). IN has been app-
lied to eliminate interference in various systems [13], [18],
[19] including instantaneous relay channels [20]. Our prior
work shows that IN is effective in improving secrecy rates in
a two-hop wiretap channel [21]. The proposed method in this
paper differs from previous works above as the neutralization
over multi-carrier systems is of high complexity. Another
important difference is that here the relays have multiple
antennas. In this paper, the eavesdroppers are also the
users of the system and the corresponding channel state
information is assumed to be accurate and available at the
relay.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
For simplicity of presentation, the relay is assumed to
have N = 2 antennas and the transmitters and receivers
are equipped with one antenna and share M = 2 frequency
subcarriers. Note that the proposed algorithm applies to ar-
bitrary number of antennas N and frequency subcarriersM .
Transmitter i, i = 1, 2, transmits symbols xi ∈ C
2×1 which
are spread over 2 frequency subcarriers by precoding matrix
Pi. For the ease of notation, we assume that precoding
matrix Pi is a square matrix. When user i transmits Si ≤ 2
symbols, then zeros are padded in xi so that its dimension is
always 2× 1 and correspondingly zero columns are padded
in Pi. If user i transmits one symbol on subcarrier 1 but
nothing on subcarrier 2, then Pi = [a, 0; 0, 0] for some
complex scalar a. If Pi is diagonal, then each symbol is
only sent on one frequency. Denote them-th transmit symbol
of user i as xi(m) which is randomly generated, mutually
independent and with covariance matrix I2. The precoding
matrix Pi satisfies the transmit power constraint of user
i: tr
(
PiP
H
i
)
≤ Pmaxi . Denote the channel gain from
transmitter (TX) i to receiver (RX) j on frequency m as
1In modern networks such as LTE, wireless links are often connected
using boosters or layer-1 repeaters (simple amplifiers) [17]. If the time
consumed for the signals to travel from a source to a repeater or from a
repeater to a destination is counted as one unit, then the total time for the
signal to travel from a source to a destination is two units - the same amount
of time for the signal to travel from a source through a smart AF relay to
a destination.
hji(m). The received signal of user i through the direct paths
of the interference channel is given by,
yi =
2∑
j=1
[
hij(1) 0
0 hij(2)
]
Pj
[
xj(1)
xj(2)
]
+
[
ni(1)
ni(2)
]
.
The circular Gaussian noise with unit variance received on
the m-th subcarrier at RX i is denoted as ni(m). We denote
the received signal at the relay as a stacked vector of the
received signal at each frequency m, with yr(m) ∈ C
2×1
representing the received signal on frequencym and the a-th
element in yr(m) representing the signal at the a-th antenna.
The received signal at the relay is given by,
yr =
2∑
j=1
[
f j(1) 02×1
02×1 f j(2)
]
Pj
[
xj(1)
xj(2)
]
+
[
nr(1)
nr(2)
]
,
where nr(m) ∈ C
2×1 is a circular Gaussian noise vector
received at frequencym with identity covariance matrix and
f j(m) is the complex vector channel from user j to the relay
on frequency m. The relay processes the received signal yr
by a multiplication of matrix R ∈ C4×4 and forwards the
signal to the RXs. Denote the channel from relay to RX i
on frequency m by gi(m) ∈ C
2×1. With the assumption of
instantaneous interference relay channel, the signals through
the direct path (through a layer-1 relay embedded in the
system) and through the intelligent relay arrive at the RXs
at the same time. The received signal at RX i is thus given
by
yi =
2∑
j=1
(
Hij +G
H
i RFj
)
Pj xj +G
H
i Rnr +ni .
where Hij = diag (hij(1), hij(2)), Gi =
diag (gi(1),gi(2)), Fi = diag (f j(1), f j(2)) and the
equivalent channel from TX j to RX i as H¯ij =
Hij +G
H
i RFj . An achievable rate of user 1 is
r1(R) = C
(
I2 +H¯11 P1 P
H
1 H¯
H
11
·
(
H¯12 P2 P
H
2 H¯
H
12 +G
H
1 RR
H G1 + I2
)−1)
where C(X) = log2 det (X). Consider that RX 2 is a
potential eavesdropper. We compute the worst-case scenario
in which RX 2 decodes all other symbols perfectly before
decoding the messages from TX 1 and RX 2 sees a MIMO
channel and decodes messages x1 utilizing both frequencies
(with a MMSE receive filter for example). An achievable
rate is then
r2←1(R) = C
(
I2 +H¯21 P1 P
H
1 H¯
H
21
(
GH2 RR
H G2 + I2
)−1)
.
An achievable secrecy rate of user 1 is then the achievable
rate of user 1 r1(R) minus the leakage rate to user 2
r2←1(R) [22]:
rs1(R) = (r1(R)− r2←1(R))
+
. (1)
Our goal is to choose R such that the secrecy leakage is
zero: H¯ij Pj = 0 for i 6= j. Consequently, the leakage rate
ri←j(R) = 0 and the secrecy rate in (1) is r
s
i (R) = ri(R)
2.
For the feasibility and limitations of information leakage
neutralization, please refer to [23]. The optimization of the
sum secrecy rates is formulated in the following.
max
R,{Pi}
2∑
i=1
C
(
IM +H¯ii Pi P
H
i H¯
H
ii
(
G
H
i RR
H
Gi + IM
)−1)
(
Hij +G
H
i RFj
)
Pj = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
tr
(
Pi P
H
i
)
≤ P
max
i ,
tr
(
R
(
K∑
i=1
Fi Pi P
H
i F
H
i
)
R
H
)
≤ P
max
r .
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE NEUTRALIZATION
Recall that the information leakage neutralization criteria(
Hij +G
H
i RFj
)
Pi = 0, when Pi is invertible, is equi-
valent to
Hij +G
H
i RFj = 0 .
Due to the block diagonal structure of Hij , Gi and Fj , one
feasible solution of the above equation is a block diagonal
R. The information leakage neutralization constraint breaks
down to the optimization over the diagonal blocks Rmm in
R: {
h12(m) + g
H
1 (m)Rmm f2(m) = 0,
h21(m) + g
H
2 (m)Rmm f1(m) = 0
. (2)
The block matrix Rmm must satisfy

(
fT1 (m)⊗ g
H
2 (m)
)
(
fT2 (m)⊗ g
H
1 (m)
)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A(m)
vec(Rmm) =
[
−h12(m)
−h21(m)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b(m)
+ z .
The vector z is any vector in the null space of A(m).
Multiplying both sides with the pseudo-inverse of A(m),
we have vec (Rmm) = (A(m))
†
(b(m) + z). Substitute
this into the relay transmit power constraint, we see that
any non-zero z contributes to an increase of relay transmit
power. With a limited power budget at relay, we propose to
implement information leakage neutralization with the least
relay transmit power and set z = 0. Thus, the relay matrix
has the m-th diagonal block equal to
Rmm = vec
−1
(
(A(m))
†
b(m)
)
(3)
2Note that IN is different from conventional zero-forcing techniques
because IN neutralizes the equivalent leakage channel to zero and thus
the eavesdroppers are not able to overhear the secrete message regardless
of receive processing employed. Also, IN does not rely on wiretap codes
to ensure secrecy, unlike other methods such as artificial noise.
where vec(.)−1 is to reverse the vectorization of a vector
columnwise to a matrix and † denotes a pseudo inverse. From
(3), we obtain the relay design R = diag (R11, . . . ,RMM ),
the optimal precoding matrices {Pi} are computed by sol-
ving Q1.
Q1 : max
{Q
i
},Q
i
0
K∑
i=1
C (IM +Qi Wi)
such that tr (Qi) ≤ P
max
i , i = 1, . . . ,K,
K∑
i=1
tr (QiXi) ≤ P¯
max
r .
where we replace Pi P
H
i by positive semi-definite va-
riable Qi and denote the following matrices Wi =
H¯
H
ii
(
GHi RR
H Gi + IM
)−1
H¯ii and Xi = F
H
i R
H RFi
and P¯maxr = P
max
r − tr
(
RRH
)
. The objective in Q1
is concave in Qi as Wi is positive semi-definite and the
constraints are linear in Qi. Thus, Q1 is a semi-definite
program and can be solved readily using convex optimi-
zation solvers, e.g. CVX3. The optimal Pi is obtained by
performing eigenvalue decomposition on Qi = Ui Di U
H
i
and Pi = UiD
1/2
i . The pseudo-code of the EFFIN is given
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The pseudo-code for Efficient Information
Leakage Neutralization (EFFIN)
1: for m = 1→M do ⊲ Compute block diagonal relay
processing matrix
2: Compute Rmm = vec
−1
(
(A(m))† b(m)
)
with
A(m) =
[ (
fT1 (m)⊗ g
H
2
(m)
)(
fT2 (m)⊗ g
H
1
(m)
) ] ,b(m) = [ −h12(m)
−h21(m)
]
.
3: end for
4: The relay processing matrix is R =
diag (R11, . . . ,RMM ).
5: Solve Q1 using convex optimization solvers and obtain
optimal {Qi}.
6: for i = 1→ 2 do ⊲ Compute precoding matrices
7: Perform eigen-value decomposition, Qi =
Ui Di U
H
i . Set Pi = Ui D
1/2
i .
8: end for
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms,
we provide in this section numerical simulations for different
3Given block diagonal R in (3), the equivalent channel Wi and matrix
Xi are also block diagonal. It is possible to solve Q1 using water-filling
with K + 1 Lagrange multipliers. For large problem size, it may be
more computational efficient using a tailor made water-filling method. For
medium size problems and illustrative purposes, we propose here to solve
by semi-definite programming.
system settings. As an example, we simulate the secrecy
rates of a relay assisted network with K = 2 users, M = 8
frequency subcarriers and N = 2 antennas at the relay.
We compare EFFIN to the following algorithms. Baseline
1 (Repeater): the relay is a layer 1 relay and is only able
to forward signals without additional signal processing. This
corresponds to setting R = IMN
√
Pmax
r
MN . Baseline 2 (IC):
the relay shuts down, i.e. R = 0MN , and we obtain an
interference channel where users eavesdrop each other. For
each baseline algorithm, we assume full spectrum sharing-
users are allowed to use the entire spectrum. Each TX
measures the channel qualities of the direct channel and the
channel from itself to the other RX. Based on the measured
channel qualities, each TX excludes frequency subcarriers
with zero secrecy rates and transmits on the channels with
non-zero secrecy rates. For subcarriers at which more than
one user would like to transmit, we assume that the TXs
coordinate so that the TX with a high secrecy rate would
transmit on that subcarrier. Despite such coordination, each
user eavesdrops other users on each subcarrier.
In Figure 2, we show achievable sum secrecy rates over
varying the transmit power constraint at the relay from 0
to 30 dB while keeping the transmit power constraint at
the TXs at 10 dB. As the IC does not utilize the relay,
the achievable sum secrecy rates are constant as the relay
power constraint increases. The achievable sum secrecy rates
achieved by a repeater decreases with relay transmit power.
This is due to the increased amplification noise in AF
relaying. However, utilizing an intelligent relay and choosing
the relaying scheme, one can improve the achievable secrecy
rate significantly, about 550% over a simple repeater and
about 200% over IC.
In Figure 3, we simulate the achievable sum secrecy rate
by the transmit power constraint at TXs from 0 to 30 dB
while keeping the transmit power at relay constraint at
23, 27, 30 dB. As the transmit power at TX increases, the
sum secrecy rates saturate in both baseline algorithms. With
the proposed information leakage neutralization, we see that
the sum secrecy rates grow unbounded with the TX power
as each user enjoys a leakage free frequency channel. Note
that the sum secrecy rates achieved by relay with power
constraint at 23, 27, 30 dB are plotted in dotted, dashed and
solid lines respectively.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose an efficient relay and transmit precoders
design for information leakage neutralization on the relay-
assisted interference relay channel with internal eavesdrop-
pers. With the proposed design, the system is broken down
to parallel information leakage free frequency channels. The
proposed designs show tremendous improvement in secrecy
rates compared to baseline methods and grow unbounded
with transmit power from transmitters.
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Fig. 2. The achievable secrecy rates of a two-user IRC with
8 frequency subcarriers is shown with varying relay power
constraint. The TX power constraints are 10 dB and there
are two antennas at the relay. The proposed scheme EFFIN
outperforms baseline algorithms Repeater and IC by 550%
and 200% respectively.
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